Cultural trends and popularity cycles can be observed all around us, yet our theories of social influence and identity expression do not explain what perpetuates these complex, often unpredictable social dynamics. We propose a theory of social identity expression based on the opposing, but not mutually exclusive, motives to conform and to be unique among ones neighbors in a social network. We then model the social dynamics that arise from these motives. We find that the dynamics typically enter random walks or stochastic limit cycles rather than converging to a static equilibrium. We also prove that without social network structure or, alternatively, without the uniqueness motive, reasonable adaptive dynamics would necessarily converge to equilibrium.
Introduction
Popular cultural practices come into and out of fashion. Researchers have observed boom-and-bust cycles of popularity in music, clothing styles, given names, automobile designs, home furnishings, and even management practices (Shuker, 2016; Richardson and Kroeber, 1940; Reynolds, 1968; Sproles, 1981; Berger, 2008; Berger and Le Mens, 2009; Lieberson, 2000; Lieberson and Lynn, 2003; Robinson, 1961; Abrahamson, 1991; Zuckerman, 2012) . Popularity cycles appear to be driven by social influence, e.g., by people adopting the music that their friends listen to or that they perceive as popular (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik and Watts, 2008) . At the individual level, people are constantly looking for new ways to express their preferred social identities (Hetherington, 1998; Rentfrow and Gosling, 2006; Berger, 2008; Chan et al., 2012) . The resultant social dynamics do not typically converge to equilibrium. What are the social forces that lead to such perpetual change and novelty? Social pressure to conform is a powerful force when behavioral patterns across a society shift in unison. Psychologists since Asch have recognized the remarkable strength of the conformity motive, stemming from a fundamental goal to fit in as part of a social group (Asch, 1955 (Asch, , 1956 Cialdini and Trost, 1998) . People tend to feel uncomfortable about considering, holding, and expressing beliefs that conflict with the prevailing views around them as well as about behaving oddly, in ways that might expose oneself as an outsider to the group (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Golman et al., 2016) . Given the conformity motive alone, we might expect to observe convergence to an equilibrium in which society becomes monolithic, yet instead we actually observe persistent diversity.
Opposing the motive to conform is a similarly universal human need for uniqueness (Snyder and Fromkin, 1980; Lynn and Snyder, 2002) . While the desire to differentiate oneself clearly works against the desire to blend in (Imhoff and Erb, 2009 ), Chan, Berger and van Boven (2012) demonstrate that people simultaneously pursue assimilation and differentiation goals, aiming to be identifiable, but not identical (see also Leibenstein, 1950; Robinson, 1961) . Preferences for idiosyncratic behavioral patterns can preserve diversity (Smaldino and Epstein, 2015) . Still, the question remains why behavioral patterns often do not remain in a stable equilibrium with everyone finding an optimal balance between distinctiveness and conformity. Why instead do behavioral patterns go through perpetual change, with particular behaviors cycling into and out of fashion as cultural trends play out?
Here, we show that along with conformity and uniqueness motives, a realistic network of social interaction is a critical, necessary ingredient for complex social dynamics to emerge. Specifically, we show that reasonable adaptive dynamics that would necessarily converge to a static equilibrium given random interactions in a well-mixed pool of people instead typically enter random walks or stochastic limit cycles, and thus never converge, when interactions are restricted to individuals' local neighborhoods in their social networks.
A natural theoretical approach for investigating social influence on decisions is to use game theory. The conformity motive in isolation would create a Keynesian beauty contest, in which what is cool (like what is beautiful) is just what everybody else believes is cool (Keynes, 1936) . The uniqueness motive in isolation would create a congestion game, in which the objective is simply to be distinct from as many other people as possible (Rosenthal, 1973) . Both games are known to be potential games, for which convergence to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is practically guaranteed (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b,a) . When both motives co-exist and the game is played on a realistic social network, however, the dynamics are more complex.
Cultural trends can be modeled more realistically as the dynamics of a game on a social network because social influence is mediated by a social network (Jackson and Zenou, 2015) . Social influence on expressions of individual identity is transmitted whenever an individual observes another person whom he would like to identify with, so the relevant social network is defined by directed connections corresponding to observation. The connected components of the social network may correspond to distinct social groups, each with its own emergent subculture.
The desire for uniqueness within one's own social group should not be conflated with a desire for differentiation across groups (Chan et al., 2012) . In models of identity signaling, membership in one group may be preferable to membership in another, and people want to strategically distin-guish themselves from those in the less favorable group; e.g., an upper class tries to distinguish itself from the bourgeois while the bourgeois tries to imitate them (Berger and Heath, 2007) . The dynamic of differentiation and imitation has been hypothesized to lead to fashion cycles (Karni and Schmeidler, 1990; Pesendorfer, 1995) . This dynamic does not, however, preserve diversity within groups. Desire for uniqueness is a necessary part of the explanation. Our model features in-group conformity and uniqueness motives; it could be augmented with a desire for differentiation across groups, but for parsimony we assume that people care only about their fit within their own groups.
Model 1: Social Identity Expression in a Well-Mixed Population
We model the expression of social identity as a game played by a population of N individuals. Let us say there are d aspects (or dimensions) of identity. Each person i chooses an expression of his identity x i ∈ {a..b} d , i.e., represented as a tuple of d integers from some interval. For example, in the case of choosing a color to wear, three integers between 0 and 255 might correspond to shades of red, green, and blue that mix together to form any color.
A person's degree of conformity in the population depends on the distance between his expressed identity and the average (population mean) expression of identity, x i −x . A person's degree of uniqueness in the population depends on the number of others who adopt the exact same expression of identity as him, denoted as n i (X) where X is the entire population's profile of expressed identities. Putting together conformity and uniqueness motives, we model person i's utility given the profile of expressed identities as
where λ is a parameter that describes the strength of the uniqueness motive relative to the conformity motive. This utility function describes a person whose goal is to be similar to everybody, yet the same as nobody.
Over time people may change their expressions of identity to achieve higher utility. We need not fully prescribe this process, but assume only that people make changes that increase their own utility, in accordance with some better-reply dynamics (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b; Friedman and Mezzetti, 2001) .
Definition 1 (Better-reply dynamics). At any given time t, one person i may consider switching from x i to x i ; he switches if and only if u i (X ) > u i (X); and for each person i and any best response x * i (to X(t)), the expected time until person i considers switching to x * i is finite.
The motivation for better-reply dynamics is that people are boundedly rational and adaptive.
They can see what the people around them are doing and can search for something better (myopically), but they do not instantaneously react to changes in other people's behavior or anticipate these changes before they occur. Many commonly assumed adaptive learning dynamics are particular specifications of better-reply dynamics.
Results: Social Dynamics in a Well-Mixed Population
Theorem 1. Suppose people derive utility from both their conformity and their uniqueness in the population, as in Equation (1). Then any better-reply dynamics necessarily converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof is presented in the SM Appendix. It follows from Lemma 1 in the SM Appendix, which identifies an exact potential function for this game. Two examples of Nash equilibria, among many that exist, are shown in Figure 1 .
Theorem 1 says that in a well-mixed population, in the long run we will not see popularity cycles, perpetual change, or novelty. The fact that we do, in reality, observe popularity cycles, perpetual change, and novelty suggests that we should consider a more realistic model. We now consider the social dynamics that result from assuming that people care only about the expressed identity of their immediate neighbors in their social network. By symmetry, the distributions can be shifted anywhere within these (or wider) domains, and many strategy profiles give rise to the same population distributions. Even after accounting for these symmetries, these Nash equilibria are not unique. denote the set of people that person i observes, i.e., his neighbors.
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Model 2: Social Identity Expression in Social Networks
Conformity among one's neighbors depends on distance from one's neighbors' average identity,x η(i) . Uniqueness among one's neighbors depends on the number neighbors who adopt the same expression of identity as oneself, denotedñ i (X; η(i)). Thus, we now model person i's utility given the profile of expressed identities X and his set of neighbors η(i) as
Results: Social Dynamics in Social Networks Theorem 2. Suppose people derive utility from both their conformity and their uniqueness among their neighbors in a social network, as in Equation (2) with λ > 1. Then there exists a social network adjacency matrixÂ such that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and, thus, betterreply dynamics never converge to an absorbing state.
Proof. By construction. We provide an example of a social network with N = 3 people that illustrates the result. (Any larger social network that contains this network as an out-component also suffices.) Let person 1 observe (only) person 2, person 2 observe (only) person 3, and person 3 observe (only) person 1.
Observe that the best response correspondence for each person is as follows:
Each person wants to be one unit of distance away from the person he is observing. However, it is impossible for all three people to simultaneously choose best responses because of the mathematical fact that odd-length cycle graphs are not 2-colorable.
Theorem 2 says that with only local interactions in a social network, perpetually changing identity expression and popularity cycles become possible. Observe that the uniqueness motive is critical for obtaining this result. If we were to eliminate the uniqueness motive by setting λ = 0, then any homogeneous profile of expressed identities (with x i identical for all i) would be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, regardless of the social network structure. The uniqueness motive along with the local interactions together allow for more realistic, complex social dynamics.
Still, Theorem 2 only provides an existence result constructed with a highly stylized, simplistic social network. It does not tell us whether complex social dynamics typically emerge from our model when people are connected by realistic social networks. We now use computational modeling to explore the dynamics of our model on realistic social networks.
We used a variant of the Jin-Girvan-Newman algorithm (Jin et al., 2001) to create a sample of out-degree (Material and Methods). For each of these social networks, we repeatedly computed better reply dynamics based on the utility function in Equation (2) to see how often the dynamics converged to equilibrium within 30, 000 time steps (Material and Methods). (We chose the cutoff at 30, 000 time steps based on first computing the dynamics in the full, well-mixed population, for which Theorem 1 tells us that they must converge, and finding that across 100 trials, the dynamics always converged within 1600 time steps.) If the dynamics did not converge within 30, 000 time steps, we classified them as non-convergent (for that trial). On average, across all 100 social networks in our sample, the dynamics were non-convergent for 99.9% of our trials. Figure 3 presents the results of 100 total trials for each of the 100 social networks in our sample, showing the number of social networks having particular frequencies of non-convergence. For each social network in our sample, the dynamics were non-convergent for at least 95 out of the 100 trials. For 93% of the social networks, the dynamics never converged.
These results tell us that with local interactions on realistic social networks, the interplay of conformity and uniqueness motives produces social dynamics for identity expression that are indeed typically non-convergent. People continually change their expressed identities, and certain forms of expression come into and out of fashion in unpredictable cycles. Popularity cycles are inherently unpredictable in the model because people typically have multiple better replies (and even multiple best responses) to choose from in the face of most profiles of their neighbors' identity expression. The multiplicty of paths the dynamics could take leaves room for idiosyncrasy.
The pattern of widespread non-convergence across the entire sample of social networks appears to be robust to variations in the process of search for a better response (i.e., it can be random or sequential), variations in the distribution and average level of out-degree in the social network (short of being fully connected, of course), and variations in the preference parameter λ (over the range λ > 1), based on additional trials reported in the SM Appendix. The social network with ID 37 is the one that most frequently permits convergence to equilibrium. Figure 4 shows this social network and one example of a Nash equilibrium on it.
Directed connections in the social network appear to play an important role in obtaining typically non-convergent dynamics. We explored the better-reply dynamics after inserting reciprocal connections in all of our directed social networks and found that on these (now) undirected social networks, the dynamics converged to equilibrium in 98.7% of our trials. (The dynamics converged within 3000 time steps in over 97% of our trials, providing reassurance that findings of non-convergence are fairly robust to allowing the dynamics more time to converge.) Intuitively, directed connections in the social network make it possible that an individual's changing expression of his identity imposes a negative externality on people who observe him, but who he does not notice. The ripple effects may persist or fade, and in more realistic, more complex social networks, they tend to persist indefinitely. 
Discussion
Our findings help us understand the role of social networks and local interaction in the dynamics of cultural trends. Popularity cycles, perpetual change, and novel expressions of social identity should be expected when people observe their neighbors in realistic, directed social networks and care about being unique as well as fitting in. Such complex social dynamics of identity expression are incompatible with simplistic assumptions disregarding social network structure or reducing social influence to mere conformity pressure absent a desire to individuate oneself.
Recognition of conformity and uniqueness as opposing, but not mutually exclusive, motives is also part of optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991; Leonardelli et al., 2010) . However, optimal distinctiveness theory posits that people form collective identities by choosing to associate themselves with social groups, whereas our concept of social identity operates at the level of the individual. In our view, collective identities emerge at the level of the group based on their members' individual identities. From the alternative, similarly valid perspective, we could propose that individual identities emerge from a psychological process of finding consonance between the collective identities of the many groups that an individual affiliates with at any point in time. Connecting these perspectives requires deeper understanding of how people choose to associate with or withdraw from social groups, how social network structure endogenously evolves. While this integration remains beyond our present grasp, we find it useful to have complementary theories aimed at different levels of social identity.
We use game theory and computational modeling here to describe social dynamics with mathematical precision. Social phenomena do not always reflect individual preferences (Schelling, 1969 (Schelling, , 1971 . Mathematical modeling helps us understand the relationship between individual motives and aggregate social dynamics when interactions generate nontrivial feedbacks. Our work here is part of a tradition of formal modeling of social identity and fashion (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Miller et al., 1993; Strang and Macy, 2001; Bettencourt, 2002; Tassier, 2004; Acerbi et al., 2012; Smaldino et al., 2012; Smaldino and Epstein, 2015; . This approach yields us deep theoretical insight, and we hope it inspires more research leading to further insights into social dynamics and identity expression.
Materials and Methods
The Social Networks
We borrow Jin, Girvan, and Newman's Model II algorithm for growing undirected social networks (Jin et al., 2001) and modify it to generate directed social networks with N = 100 people, each of whom can observe up to a maximum of 5 neighbors. The network is initialized with all 100 people and no connections. The following three steps are then repeated 100 times:
1. Choose 3 pairs of individuals uniformly at random. For each pair i and j, if i observes less than 5 people and does not already observe j, then i begins to observe j; else, if j observes less than 5 people and does not already observe i, then j begins to observe i.
2. Randomly select triads i, j, and k such that i observes k and k observes j or that i and j both observe k. If i observes less than 5 people and does not already observe j, then i begins to observe j. (Real social networks exhibit both patterns of directed closure (Brzozowski and Romero, 2011).) 3. Randomly select and break 0.5% of connections (rounded up).
All 100 social networks and the Python source code used to create them will be made available in the SM Appendix.
The Game
Our computational model adopts the following specification of parameter values for the game:
The Better-Reply Dynamics
Our computational model adopts a specification of the better-reply dynamics in which at each time step, one individual searches for (and upon discovery, adopts) a better reply to the current population profile. Initial strategies are randomly (uniformly) distributed. We check for convergence after every 200 time steps by sequentially checking whether any individual can find a better reply.
In the other time steps, the individual searching for a better reply is randomly selected. The Python source code and complete output data will be made available in the SM Appendix.
Supplementary Materials Formal Definitions
We can express person i's neighbors' average identity as
We can express the number of i's neighbors who adopt the same expression of identity as person i
where δ is the Kronecker delta function. In a well-mixed population, we set η(i) = {j : j = i} to recover n i (X) for all i.
Supplementary Results and Proofs
Lemma 1. In a well-mixed population with utility functions given in Equation (1), the game has an exact potential function:
Proof. Consider a change in the profile of identities X → X resulting from person i alone changing his identity x i → x i , i.e., such that x j = x j for all j = i. We need only show that the change in the potential function equals the change in i's utility: Φ(X ) − Φ(X) = u i (X ) − u i (X).
We express the change in the potential function as a sum of the changes in each term:
1 2 λ (n j (X) − n j (X )) .
We consider each of the two summations separately.
We expand the first sum:
We find it useful to express the average identity asx = N −1 Nx −i + 1 N x i . Plugging in to the first term in Equation (3), we have:
Plugging in to the second term in Equation (3), expanding and canceling off common terms, we have for any j = i:
Observe that the last term here drops out when we sum over all j = i because j =i (x j −x −i ) = 0.
The first term does not depend on j, so summing over all j = i just multiplies this term by a factor 20 of (N − 1). Putting it all together, we find that Equation (3) simplifies to:
Now, returning to the second part of the change in the potential function, we can use the formal definition of n j (X) to write:
The terms cancel whenever j = i and k = i, so we are left with: N j=1 1 2 λ (n j (X) − n j (X )) =
δ(x j , x i ) − δ(x j , x i ) = λ (n i (X) − n i (X )) . (5) Putting Equations (4) and (5) together, we have now shown that Φ(X ) − Φ(X) = u i (X ) − u i (X).
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 now follows from Lemma 1 by Monderer and Shapley's argument (1996b) .
